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Two years after the first free elections in the history
of South Africa, which brought the liberation move-
ment to political power, a new twist was added to the
seemingly ever-present violence of the gang-lands
of Cape Town. A vigilante movement dominated by
Cape Muslims, People Against Gangsterism and
Drugs (PAGAD), launched a series of assassinations
of local drug lords and vowed to free the post-
apartheid townships of the scourge of crime and
drugs. Since autumn of the year 2000, PAGAD's mili-
tant actions have ceased to pose a security threat in
Cape Town. Most of the militants of the movement
are behind bars. But even long after the movement
reached its zenith and decline, academics have failed
to reach a consensus over what the peculiar phenom-
enon of PAGAD actually represented.
Revisiting PAGAD
Machoism or Islamism?
PAGAD grew out of a network of civic move-
ments and neighbourhood watches on the
so-called Cape Flats, and was established by
a group of predominantly Muslim teachers
and social workers in 1996. Cape Flats refers
to the residential areas to which Cape
Town's coloured population was forcibly re-
moved when strict residential segregation
was imposed by the apartheid authorities in
the 1960s and 1970s. The living conditions
in the townships of the Cape Flats vary, but
the general pattern is one of overcrowding,
lack of public facilities, and increasing un-
employment. For the coloured gangs in-
volved in crime and trafficking in drugs, the
Cape Flats had proven to be fertile ground
for recruitment ever since the forced re-
movals. Among ordinary township resi-
dents, there was at the time of PAGAD's
emergence a perception to the effect that
the level of crime had spiralled out of con-
trol since the abolishment of apartheid, and
that the post-apartheid authorities were un-
able and unwilling to curtail the activities of
township gangs.
From the outset, PAGAD was a media phe-
nomenon. The movement burst into the
media headlines when a renowned gangster
from the Cape Flats, Rashaad Staggie, was
assassinated in camera by a mob of PAGAD
supporters outside his home in the suburb
of Salt River on 4 August 1996. South African
vigilantism has traditions dating back to the
late 19t h century. What was new in the case
of PAGAD was that this time it was perpe-
trated by a movement drawing heavily on
the religious imagery of Islam. PAGAD's
stance towards the local media was ambigu-
ous: on the one hand, PAGAD leaders knew
very well that township youngsters in Cape
Town were attracted by the visual images of
the seemingly omnipotent, scarf-clad PAGAD
members that appeared in the media. On the
other hand, the white-dominated media was
lambasted as 'Islamophobic' by PAGAD on
various occasions. 
The Muslims of Cape Town
The coloured Muslims of Cape Town are
the descendants of slaves and political ex-
iles brought to the 'Mother City' in the peri-
od between 1658 and 1808, and of misce-
genation between the various ethnic
groups present in South Africa through and
since the colonial era. The Indian Muslims of
Cape Town are the descendants of free Mus-
lim tradesmen and some indentured labour-
ers that both arrived in South Africa in the
late 19t h century. Whereas a mere 1.4 per
cent of South Africans are Muslim, approxi-
mately 10.4 per cent of Cape Townians are
M u s l i m .1 Historically, the cultural and reli-
gious practices of the Cape Muslims have
been heavily influenced by Sufism. The
Islam of the Cape Muslims can generally be
considered as tolerant, which is indicated by
a high frequency of intermarrying and so-
cializing with non-Muslims, especially
among the poorer sections of the communi-
ty. 
Throughout the years of apartheid, most
Cape Muslims remained politically compla-
cent. Individual Muslims, such as the Pan-
Africanist Congress-oriented imam Abdul-
lah Haron (who died in police detention in
1969) made great sacrifices in the struggle
against apartheid. The Pan-Africanist Con-
gress was a splinter group from the ANC
Youth League, established in 1959 under
the leadership of Robert Mangaliso Sobuk-
we. Young Muslim anti-apartheid activists
took part in the struggle of the streets in Call
of Islam and Qibla, as well as in the umbrella
anti-apartheid movement United Democra-
tic Front2 in the 1980s, but they were in mi-
nority in their communities. In the post-
apartheid context, however, one has seen a
selective process of remembering among
Cape Muslims in which the Muslim contri-
bution to the fight against apartheid, rather
than the complacency of most Muslims in
that era, has been highlighted. It seems rea-
sonable to regard this as the outcome of the
attempts of Cape Muslim leaders to position
the Muslim community vis--vis the post-
apartheid authorities.3
The internal conflicts 
The assassination of Rashaad Staggie in
1996 exposed the conflictive interests and
opinions of Cape Muslims. The state appara-
tus, represented by the senior ANC minister
Mohammed 'Dullah' Omar, had initially
sought to bring PAGAD into alignment with
the government through talks with the lead-
ers of the movement, but through the assas-
sination of Staggie, PAGAD had in effect
made this impossible. PAGAD was labelled a
vigilante movement by the government,
and the minority of Cape Muslims support-
ive of the ANC government turned their
backs towards PAGAD's actions, which they
regarded as counter-productive. The path
towards an increasing anti-state rhetoric o f
PAGAD leaders in the following years, and
the process of government labelling of
PAGAD members as 'urban terrorists' that
ensued, lay open. But PAGAD could count
on massive support from the Cape Muslim
community. In a survey published in No-
vember 1996 it was found that 62 per cent
of Muslim respondents were supportive of
PAGAD. In comparison, a mere 17 per cent
of Christian respondents were supportive of
the movement.4 The support of the Muslim
middle class and lower-middle class in
coloured residential areas appeared to be
particularly strong. In sum, PAGAD had pop-
ular but not intellectual support. Many Cape
Muslim intellectuals paid a heavy price for
distancing themselves from PAGAD's ac-
tions: in 1998, a pipe-bomb was thrown at
the house of the senior scholar in Religious
Studies, Dr Ebrahim Moosa. A prominent
imam, Sa'dullah Khan (imam at al-Quds
Masjid in Gatesville, one of the largest
mosques in Cape Town), received death
threats and opted to leave the country;
whereas the senior ANC politician, Ebrahim
Rasool, lived under constant police surveil-
lance for long periods. 
But the toll exacted on ordinary township
residents was Ð as usual Ð higher. As the as-
sassination attempts on gangsters on the
Cape Flats degenerated into regular warfare
between PAGAD and the gangs, civilians
were caught in the crossfire. In the commu-
nity of 'Mekaar' (the name of which has been
altered), where I was to undertake fieldwork
two years later, stray bullets killed a six-year-
old girl in November 1998, as was the case
with two other minors the same year. Two
suspected PAGAD members, both practising
Muslims, were later convicted for her murder
on the grounds of 'common purpose'. 
Academic representation
o f P A G A D
The academic literature on the PAGAD
phenomenon is limited. No systematic in-
vestigation of the movement has been un-
dertaken. There are however, a number of
theses, articles, and reports, the most signif-
icant of which have been produced by acad-
emics affiliated to the University of Cape
Town and the University of the Western
Cape in Bellville.5 These authors' analyses of
PAGAD diverge on one point in particular.
Tayob and Esack point to the links between
Islamist rhetoric and PAGAD's actions,
whereas Jeppie and Pillay are sceptical
about attaching importance to such links.
Pillay perceives PAGAD as an expression of
globalized, Hollywood-style representa-
tions of machoism that have been appropri-
ated and localized by both the gangs and
the vigilantes. Jeppie suggests that PAGAD
reflects a crisis of leadership among South
African Muslims, and that it serves as an av-
enue for the reinsertion of former drug ad-
dicts and petty gangsters into society.
Hence, to both Pillay and Jeppie the reli-
gious imagery invoked by PAGAD appears
to be mere strategic posturing for the Mus-
lim township public. Even though one
should not necessarily take the assertions of
PAGAD members at face value, such analy-
ses risk treating the outward expressions of
PAGAD as mere epiphenomena in relation
to the social causes of the phenomenon. For
instance, there seems to be little doubt that
Qibla, a militant organization heavily influ-
enced by Islamism, gained control over
PAGAD after the assassination of Staggie in
1996. My experience with PAGAD members
during fieldwork suggests that Islamism
may be of greater significance than what
has been assumed so far. All but one of the
alleged PAGAD members in 'Mekaar' had at
some point pursued religious careers. One
of them was a long-standing member of
Qibla, whose formative political experiences
had been the Iranian revolution of 1979 and
the anti-apartheid struggle of the 1980s.
This is certainly at some remove from the
impressions of the 'gun-ho' machoism that
was so central to the local media's represen-
tation of PAGAD. As a political and social
phenomenon, PAGAD was intimately
bound up with the hybrid social formations
from which it originated, and was therefore
multi-faceted. The question of whether
PAGAD is an expression of machoism or Is-
lamism is an awkward one, since it appears
to have expressed both.
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